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from sales outside the United States, they extort reciprocal trade. Yet, upon close examination, we see that their position is hypocritical.

On the one hand, they demonstrate a passion for the export of their products. On the other, they show a violent antipathy toward imports of products competitive with their own.

General Electric and Westinghouse no longer claim that their profits are being trimmed on account of occasional contract awards to our friends overseas. Instead, they predicate their opposition on the alleged belief that these two recent purchases constitute a threat to our security!

We need not be deceived. Their method of attack has changed. Their object, however, has remained the same—eliminate foreign competition and preserve the managed price system of operation.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the Congress well knows of my deep concern for the welfare and strength of our Nation. A substantial part of my activities, as a Member of this body for the last 16 years, has been devoted to insuring that the security and defense of the United States be maintained at the highest possible level. Therefore, I would look carefully at any claim that this strength of ours was being threatened.

I must confidently and strongly reject the bogus charges that have been directed at these two contract awards.

We must not let the flag wavers obscure the real issues.

We are all concerned with the economy of governmental operations, is it not manifestly clear that these two purchases under discussion will result in tremendous dollar savings to the agencies concerned and to the taxpayers' of our Nation?

Are we not also interested in the position of the United States in relation to the rest of the world?

Thus the interchange of ideas and products being highly desirable and economically beneficial to all countries participating should be promoted, not opposed by the governments involved.

Let me say, too, that this is not a partisan issue. The Los Angeles Herald and Express, on February 26, 1959, made the following editorial comment:

Vice President RICHARD NIXON, on his recent visit to Los Angeles, said gravely that the inflation caused by spiraling wages and prices threatens to force us out of the world market, and already has forced us out of several European markets. And yet, in the instance of the Los Angeles generators, inflation has priced our own U.S. firms out of the U.S. markets. The people, communities, the industries of the United States should be encouraged to buy American as much as possible in these critical times, but the prices of American goods must be brought down to practical levels where they can afford to buy them.

I agree with the Vice President's statement generally, and I believe I have proven that in this case it is not the wages paid to American workers that have caused the inflation, but rather the extraordinary high profits of the managed price corporations. These managed prices have forced our Government purchasers of equipment to exercise pru-

dent business judgment and award their contracts to the lowest responsible bidders.

I affirm that the facts completely fail to disclose an impairment or a threat of impairment of the security of the United States or even of its domestic electrical industry. Any action that might have impaired the awarding of these contracts would have injured the United States as a trading nation in the eyes of the world. It would have deprived this country of a valued source of supply and the cost of our Government operation would have been vastly increased.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization understood what the real issues were and ruled clearly and firmly against the protest of the American manufacturers. These contracts which were honestly and effectively awarded will now be proceeded upon as originally intended.

Recent events show the wisdom of this course of action. General Electric has announced price reductions in the field of heavy electrical generating equipment. It also announced that it would modify the escalator clause in its contracts.

The New York Times noted this step with approval and stated editorially on July 16:

One of the giants of American industry has just administered some of its prices downward. The General Electric Co. has announced on successive days reductions in prices of its turbines, both large and small.

What the announcements did not say was that foreign competition is a large element in the decision at least for the big turbines. The revival of Western Europe is producing a benefit that Americans had perhaps not foreseen—the infusion of an extra element of competition in parts of American industry that have been to some extent immune during most of the postwar period.

In a sense, we as consumers are getting our Marshall plan money back.

Mr. Speaker, it is for these reasons that I have felt impelled to take the floor and present the true story of these contract awards to the Congress and to the people.

ARMY AVIATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, you will recall that I had occasion to discuss the very essential roles and objectives of aviation in the U.S. Army on this floor last June 29. At that time I traced the history of Army aviation, its mission and the size of this operation in the Army today. Today I would like to take a few minutes in discussing this subject further.

First, there is apparently some misunderstanding in certain segments of the American public as to the distinction between Army aviation and the U.S. Air Force. Let me emphasize at this time that we can be sure that the Army has neither any intention of competing for missions in the aviation field with the Air Force, nor any remote design of creating another air corps within the Army's ranks. Both by executive direc-

tive and by operations instructions, Army aviation is intended for use in the ground battle area. Within this area it accomplishes essential work of two broad categories. First, as an extension of the combat reconnaissance effort, aviation is used in very much the same way that our Indian fighting Army once used horse cavalry; namely as a more rapid means of acquiring that information of the enemy and of the terrain which is essential to the ground combat role. In supplementing this effort Army aircraft are used to assure reliable communications among combat headquarters and to search for, identify, and bring fire to bear on enemy targets. The second broad mission of aviation, again serving in the ground combat area, is to move troops and equipment to places where they are needed and where the tactical situation or the time element or both dictate the use of aircraft for this purpose. I am sure that all of you, particularly the combat veterans amongst us, are aware that there are occasions in battle where the timely delivery of a critically needed item of equipment can spell the difference between victory and defeat. The same reasoning applies to the movement of critically needed personnel to man our weapons. These, then, are in laymen's language the functions of aviation in the Army. As is obvious, there is no conflict here with the missions of the Air Force.

Now I do not pretend to infer that there are no proponents in the Army of using Army aircraft for certain combat missions formerly performed by the air service of World War I, the Air Corps of World War II, and even the Air Force in Korea. In looking into this subject I had occasion recently to read of the activities of that great patriot and commander of our expeditionary forces in France during the First World War, General of the Armies Pershing—"Stamps and Esposito," a short military history of World War I, USMA, 1950, page 323. In the initial combat operation of the 1st U.S. Army as an entity during September of 1918, General Pershing, assisted by his 1st Army aviation officer, Col. William Mitchell—known later to history as Gen. Billy Mitchell—used the aircraft available to him in about three equal portions. These were strategic bombing, ground support, and observation. This proportion, which worked admirably in the open warfare of the St. Mihiel salient, has changed progressively in the years since 1918 up to today where, at one end of the spectrum we see the Air Force charged exclusively with the strategic bombing mission, and at the other end the Army charged with the mission of providing its own local tactical observation.

The Army is already experimenting quite successfully with the use of armed helicopters. These air vehicles are being developed to provide the same firepower capabilities to sky cavalry units that the repeating carbine provided to the cavalry formations of both Confederate Gen. J. E. B. Stuart and later Union Gen. Phil Sheridan, both of whom, incidentally, operated most effectively in the terrain

to the west of and not too distant from this city of Washington.

This, then, is the shape of things to come, and represents a large step forward in the race to develop a tough, aggressive ground combat force, prepared to defy tyranny and oppression wherever it may appear on the face of the earth. This expanded use of air vehicles to help materially in the composition of such an Army—mobile and determined and ready—is being quietly and competently developed by a group of devoted Army officers both here in the Pentagon and out in the field, who are concerned in the final analysis with only one subject, and that is an adequate defense posture for our country.

Let me now turn briefly to a personality who has recently arrived on the Washington scene as the newly appointed Director of Army Aviation in the Pentagon. Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann is a member of that elite group within the Army who is both a soldier and a scholar. Armed with a graduate degree from Harvard University as well as a diploma from our National War College, General von Kann has had the opportunity for broad and responsible service as an officer of his young years. Not yet 45, General von Kann has served in troop assignments, in the Office of the Army Comptroller, and in an executive capacity at the Central Intelligence Agency. He comes to Washington from duty as assistant division commander of our famed 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. While at Fort Bragg he had the opportunity to serve with Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, until very recently the division commanding general, who was the first Director of Army Aviation.

General von Kann shows a clear and canny grasp of the multitudinous problems and challenges which face Army aviation in the coming years. To illustrate this point I would like to introduce for the Record a speech which General von Kann delivered to the Army Aviation Association of America on June 6. I urge all Members of this body to give this very astute speech their careful attention when it appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

His speech follows:

OPERATIONAL TRENDS IN ARMY AVIATION

(Speech for the Army Aviation Association of America by Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, June 6, 1959)

May I say that it is a threefold honor to be here today. It is an honor to address this outstanding group which I know is destined to make very significant contributions to the future of Army aviation. Secondly, it is an honor to be pinch-hitting for my distinguished boss, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, who did so much to further the cause of Army aviation. And finally, it is an honor for me to be speaking as the newly designated Director of Army Aviation.

Now it is obvious that I cannot speak from a platform of long service in aviation. However, my last 2 years have given me some opportunity to deal with operational problems involving combat units. I have worked closely with Army aviation in five major divisional maneuvers involving the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division. Twenty-four hours ago I was actively participating in Exercise Dark Cloud/Pine Cone II, a large joint maneuver involv-

ing the 82d Airborne Division and the U.S. Air Force. Over 100 Army aircraft supported the division in the exercise; and all were in continuous use, both day and night. I have seen Army aviation operate tactically in midwinter in Alaska and have witnessed Army aviation in three major command post exercises involving field army and higher units. On this basis I would like to offer a few observations.

My first is that even with the limitations of some current models, I am deeply and completely convinced that Army aviation is the one major breakthrough in mobility the Army has made since World War II. We have lightened some items of equipment (while adding to many others). But when we strike the balance, the only quantum jump is the fact that right now, today, a squad, a platoon, or a rifle company can be in position A one instant, and 10 minutes later can be in position B 5 miles away—and ready to fight. Thus we are combining the two most mobile elements in warfare—the foot soldier and the airplane.

Significant, too, is the fact that the commander can once again ride around the battlefield, can see for himself the actual situation on the ground, can give appropriate orders on the spot, and then take off to other decisive areas. In short, the helicopter has returned command by physical leadership to the battlefield in place of command via the situation map. All this can be done with existing aircraft. Also very important is the fact that we are on the threshold of developments by which light but potent weapons, such as rockets and missiles, can be married with low performance aircraft and possess the same mobility as the troops to be supported.

I am also convinced that the problems of the atomic battlefield can only be solved by intelligent application of our aviation potential. We can no longer tie our infantry to key terrain features; we can no longer hold on to the highest ground, or to any key real estate, for that matter; to do so is to invite annihilation. On the atomic battlefield we must rather depend upon elusiveness, speed of maneuver, quick concentration and dispersion, and more than anything else, maintenance of the integrity of our force. Army aviation is unique in its ability to offer many and varied solutions to this basic problem; and with our aircraft we have the high ground when we need it.

Another basic contribution of Army aviation is its ability to offer solutions to the problem posed by a numerically larger enemy. After World War II we realized that we would be outnumbered in future wars by masses of manpower, but thought then that we could beat down these masses by firepower. From the standpoint of firepower and equipment, it is now evident that this will not be the road to victory on tomorrow's battlefield. We may be able to win out over superior numbers; but if we do, it must be by capitalizing on techniques which allow one of our men to be in as many places as 3 or 4 or 6 or 10 of the enemy in the same time period. This is another way of saying that the mobility offered us by aviation can be used to overcome the fact that we are outnumbered. Provided, of course, that we utilize our potential more effectively than the enemy. In this respect I do not want to be an alarmist; but I know that our enemies are not asleep to the possibilities in this field. So there is pressure upon us to develop our capabilities faster than he.

If we can develop and realize this great potential before the enemy does, then we can become the innovators and reap the advantages which go with originality. Military history is replete with examples of decisive advantage being gained through innovation particularly in the field of mobility. Every great captain in history won key battles by moving faster than the enemy

thought possible. With the ICBM stalemate, it should be evident that the United States must insure its own ability to win limited conflicts fought under the umbrella of the stalemate. Nowhere else in our arsenal of new weapons and techniques can I see even the beginning of such possibilities for innovation in mobility as lie in the developments which the aviation industry is straining to fulfill. I therefore say with the sincerest belief that not only the future of ground tactics but quite possibly our national security may depend on how we use and exploit aviation to support ground combat.

However, I must temper my own enthusiasm by pointing out that the road is not an easy one. First of all, with any breakthrough item there is the time problem of getting these items into the hands of commanders and under conditions where commanders and their troops may develop the best techniques for using them. In the case of aviation many of our commanders do not understand aviation, and we all tend to recoil from things we don't understand. We must remember that only a few years ago a lieutenant colonel didn't dare ask for a helicopter ride. He could not foresee the possibility of having fulltime use of such a vehicle. Five years later our lieutenant colonel comes back to troop duty a grade higher and in command of a battle group. He now has his own helicopter, he has fixed wing overhead to give him eyes on the battlefield; and he can call for cargo helicopters to move his rifle units. Is it any wonder that it takes time before he can effectively utilize these and many more aircraft in the accomplishment of his mission?

We must also remember that training people to use aviation effectively does not come easily, especially when we are flying in and out of dusty strips and confined areas. Combat maneuvers in these places are frequently dangerous and always time consuming to set up and rehearse. Therefore bear in mind that it takes time to train aviators to work with tactical units. An even more critical factor is the time it takes the tactical units to learn to work with aviation. This is not a serious problem in flying from airfield to airfield; but when the destination or pickup point is a small clearing in the woods; it becomes a problem of different dimensions.

I would like to leave the thought in your mind that it takes approximately a year to develop a truly professional standard of teamwork between the infantry units of a division and the aviation which must work with these units. A great deal of hardware and gadgetry must be improvised. Landing aids, ground handling gear, and other auxiliary items must be fabricated; this takes time, patience, practice, and funds. None of these are readily available resources in today's Army, especially the funds.

What this really means is that Army aviation is in the position of the man who is trying to build a house and at the same time extinguish a fire that has broken out inside. We must keep building for the future; and there is real time pressure upon us to realize the great potential that aviation has for the Army. On the other hand we must not be so preoccupied with the future that we fail to extinguish the fires that are now burning. In this respect we have a real obligation to police up our program as it now stands—to make of Army aviation a consistent, constructive, and well-balanced program—managed by truly professional aviators.

Another area of difficulty is that of rationalizing the role of Army aviation with that of Air Force aviation. This problem lends itself to many unfortunate misunderstandings. Now with regard to the functions of Army aviation vis-a-vis those of the Air Force, I feel that we should not duplicate functions and services which the Air Force